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I. Introduction
A well-known strategist announced that an unprecedented free
flow of information has transformed citizens into "genuinely
global consumers" who "all share the same information."' A
Fortune article enthusiastically declared, "[t]hinking about going
t Associate Professor and Ackerman Scholar, University of Connecticut. Thanks to Tia
Chatterjee and Gregory Kirber for valuable research assistance.
tt Adjunct Professor of Law, Taxation, and Financial Planning, Bentley University.
I Kenichi Ohmae, Managing in a Borderless World, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
1989, at 154.
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global? Friend, you're too late. The train has already left. Today
the competition for goods, services and ideas pays no respects to
national borders ... A one-world market exists for products
ranging from cars to consumer electronics to carbonated drinks." 2
These comments are not recent posts on a blog or Twitter account,
but are instead twenty-year-old declarations about the state of
global commerce. If consumers from the 1980s, having neither
the internet nor smartphones, were considered globally aware, then
by today's standards such consumers could be regarded as utterly
indifferent to geographic and informational barriers. The internet,
along with multinational commerce of the past twenty years, has
created an integrated and universal consumer marketplace.'
Unfortunately, when technology and commerce advance, legal
rules inevitably lag behind.4 American courts have often not been
so globally minded as their consumer counterparts.' While
consumers are increasingly aware of some foreign trademarks, a
sharp circuit split among the federal courts has placed the
protection of these valuable foreign marks in jeopardy.6 In spite of
earlier precedent holding that well-known foreign marks are
entitled to protection,' a Second Circuit decision denied that
protection for foreign marks when a subsequent user has used the
2 Richard 1. Kirkland, Jr., Entering a New Age of Boundless Competition,
FORTUNE, Mar. 14, 1988, at 40. These proclamations were also cited by an author in
1991 for a similar purpose, to advocate for the greater protection of foreign marks.
James A. Carney, Setting Sights on Trademark Piracy: The Need for Greater Protection
Against Imitation ofForeign Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 30, 30 (1991).
3 See Prabir K. Neogi & Arthur J. Cordell, The Internet and the Need for
Governance: Learning from the Past, Coping with the Future, 15 J. INTERNET BANK. &
COM. 2,3 (2010).
4 See Dan Svantesson, A Legal Method for Solving Issues of Internet Regulation,
19 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 243, 256 (2011); Sean B. Seymore, Atypical Inventions, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2057, 2059 (2011) (citing Earl Warren, Science and the Law:
Change and the Constitution, 12 J. PUB. L. 3, 5 (1963) ("[T]he development of science
and technology and law do not advance hand in hand because '[t]he law lags behind until
crisis stirs it into action"').
5 Cf Andrew N. Adler, Translating & Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 37,45 (1997) (explaining how American courts are generally unable to interpret
and translate foreign law due to inexperience and monolingualism).
6 Andrew Cook, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: A Study of the Well-Known Marks
Doctrine in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 417 (2009).
7 See Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098-99 (9th Cir.
2004).
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trademark domestically and a foreign user had abandoned the
mark.' As a result, foreign trademark owners cannot be certain
that their trademarks will receive full and appropriate protection in
the United States.' This lack of protection arguably places the
United States in violation of two major international treaties
governing the protection of intellectual property rights.'0
Scholars have recommended various solutions to the well-
known marks problem. The most prominent solution reassesses
the Lanham Act to better meet international trademark
obligations." Some writers advocate for amending the Lanham
Act to include protection of well-known foreign marks. 2 Others
remark that U.S. law does provide redress for owners of well-
known foreign marks under international treaties, but that legal
reforms remain necessary to solidify appropriate protection. 3
Another proposed solution is the establishment of an international
registry for well-known foreign marks as an amendment to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).' 4
While these proposals are certainly meritorious, this article
8 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2nd Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 827 (2007).
9 See, e.g., Maruti.com v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 2d 494, 500 (D. Md.
2006) (holding that the Fourth Circuit does not recognize the well-known marks
doctrine).
10 The two treaties are the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
I1 Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in US. Trademark
Law: How the Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (and Why the Second
Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1347, 1378 (2010).
12 See Blake W. Jackson, Notorious: The Treatment of Famous Trademarks in
America and How Protection Can be Ensured, 3 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 61, 89
(2009); Cook, supra note 6, at 413; Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from
Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks that Are Well
Known but Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1423 (2008).
13 See, e.g, Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1352-53.
14 See, e.g., Mindy Pava, Comment, The Cuban Conundrum: Proposing an
International Trademark Registry for Well-Known Foreign Marks, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 631, 679 (2011).
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takes a different tack. Although non-recognition of well-known
marks is a domestic judicial question, it is an issue with a
potentially profound global influence." As foreign interests are
thwarted by non-recognition of well-known marks, their respective
governments will feel compelled to take action on their behalf."
The result could be a retributive wave of sanctions against
American interests." Not only are trademarks at stake, but any
intellectual property dispute with the United States could be
justified or reinforced in part by citing America's failure to honor
its own treaty commitments toward well-known foreign marks."
If used adroitly by foreign powers, a single court decision could
generate ripple effects through American commerce.
This article explores the extent to which non-enforcement of
well-known foreign marks in the United States can impact
domestic interests around the world. Part I examines the legal
protection of well-known foreign marks in the United States. It
reviews the relevant treaties, explains the circuit split of opinion,
and shows that the current state of affairs presents an uncertain
and insufficient level of protection for well-known foreign marks.
Part II analyzes the global impact of non-enforcement of these
marks, highlighting the unique vulnerability that U.S. trademarks
possess in a global space. Part II also discusses how nations
seeking retribution could use international, national, and local
interests to interfere with U.S. interests through both informal and
formal means. Part III briefly explores how firms can defend
15 See LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1391 (noting there were 150 contracting parties
to TRIPS).
16 See Marshall Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Leaffer, The New World]
(discussing how the American territoriality approach to trademarks foregrounds national
interests).
17 Cf Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding
the Golan Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 131, 143 (2010)
(describing the United States' copyright policy as "antiforeign" and how international
pressure and trade policy affected the United States' decision to eventually join the
Berne Convention).
18 Cf LaLonde, supra note 12, at 134; see also Ethan Horwitz & Jill Wasserman,
Famous Indian Restaurant Bukhara Denied Protection by Second Circuit,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 2007, at 62 ("[I]f U.S. courts are seen as failing to
protect foreign interests, U.S. companies will be in a weaker positions to assert their
rights as U.S. entities under TRIPS in the courts and tribunals of foreign jurisdictions.").
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well-known marks abroad in an uncertain legal environment.
While lobbying for legislative action might be the ideal solution,
firms can take a number of steps to inoculate themselves from the
most invidious reactions of foreign governments dissatisfied with
American treatment of intellectual property. Part IV concludes.
II. The Domestic Legal Protection of Famous Foreign
Trademarks
A. Trademark Law and the Limitations of Territoriality
The underlying statute of federal trademark law is the Lanham
Act of 1946.19 Among other things, the Lanham Act prohibits the
infringement of protected trademarks and also empowers
trademark owners to stop others from infringing.2 0 The purpose of
the Act is to protect consumers from confusion between product
sources and defend mark owners from rivals' attempts to trade off
the reputation of the owned mark.2 1 In order to gain protection
under the Lanham Act, an owner of a trademark must show that a
rival's use creates a likelihood of confusion for consumers
between the established trademark and the challenged use.22 if a
mark owner proves a likelihood of confusion in court, it can stop
the rival's use and recover damages for losses.2 3
Disputes over protection of well-known marks often come
within the context of trademark priority. Such a dispute can occur
when a junior user commences publication of a mark that conflicts
with an established foreign mark of earlier creation.2 4 A notable
characteristic of the Lanham Act is its distinct determination of
trademark priority.25 First ownership of a trademark is determined
19 Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-l141n).
20 See id.
21 See Peter W. Smith, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A
Workable Lanham Act Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1525, 1529 (1991)
("One of the principal goals of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers from confusion
and deception in the marketplace.").
22 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005).
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:74 (4th ed. 2012).
24 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29.1.
25 Id. § 16.
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by the use of that trademark in ordinary commerce.2 6 This rule
governing priority in. the United States has been called the "first in
time, first in right" rule.2 7 The rule contrasts with the practices of
most nations that give trademark priority and ownership to the
entity that first filed an application or obtained a registration. 2 8
While registration of a mark cannot negate prior usage of that
mark by another in the United States, registration or application, in
most other countries, sets the definitive date for trademark
29priority. In other words, most countries allow a trademark holder
to gain priority over challengers by being the first to register or
apply for protection, regardless of when the applicant first used the
mark in commerce.3 0
While questions of priority can trigger well-known mark
disputes, the underlying principle of greatest concern to well-
known mark protection is the principle of territoriality." The
territoriality principle holds that the priority of trademark rights
depends solely on the priority of use in the country at issue and not
on the priority of use anywhere else in the world.3 2 This principle
stems from traditional notions of the important domestic functions
trademarks serve, the independence of domestic rights from
foreign obligations, and the concept of tying trademark protections
to existing national political units.3 3 It also stems from the broader
legal tradition of territoriality, in which certain laws are applied
according to where the event giving rise to the legal claim takes
place.34
Under the territoriality principle, courts recognize the right to
26 Id. § 16:4.
27 Id. § 16:1.
28 Id. ("Whereas most civil law nations follow the rule that ownership and priority
go to the party who was first to file an application or obtain a registration, in the United
States, the rule of priority is that ownership and priority go to the party who was first-to-
use.").
29 Id § 16:4.
30 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 16:4.
31 See Cook, supra note 6, at 423 (explaining the relationship between the
territoriality principle and the principle of well-known mark protection).
32 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29:1.
33 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark
Law from the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REv. 885, 907-08 (2004).
34 See id at 892.
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use a mark in each country based solely on usage in that country
and without reference to use of the same mark abroad.35 The
converse approach is the principle of universality, which holds that
a mark signifies the same source wherever it is used in the world.36
The United States follows the territoriality principle."
Early international treaties incorporated the territoriality
principle as well. For example, the principle is reflected in Article
6(3) of the Paris Convention of 1883, which states, "[a] mark duly
registered in a country of the [Paris] Union shall be regarded as
independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union,
including the country of origin."" The Paris Convention thus
established minimum protections for intellectual property and
introduced the principle of national treatment.39  This principle
holds that member nations must treat foreign marks the same as
they treat domestic ones. 4 0  The Madrid Agreement of 1891
established a registration system called the Madrid Union.4 1 Upon
filing under the Madrid Union, a domestically registered mark
receives the same protection in member nations designated by the
applicant as if the mark had been registered separately in each
nation.42 The Paris Convention and the Madrid Agreement can be
interpreted as not establishing a global trademark system, but
rather reinforcing the notion that each nation's trademark law shall
have only territorial application. 4 3
The territoriality principle's country-by-country protection is
based on the premise that a mark functions to connote goodwill
rather than the origin of the goods per se.44 Territoriality, unlike
35 Pava, supra note 14, at 634.
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29:1.
37 Id
38 Paris Convention, supra note 10, art. 6.
39 Id. art. 2.
40 Id
41 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14,
1891, as last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
42 Id. art. 2.
43 See Carlo Cotrone, The United States and the Madrid Protocol: A Time to
Decline, a Time to Accede, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 75, 96 (2000).
44 See Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1392 ("An owner's right to prevent others from
using a confusingly similar mark is limited to the area in which the owner possesses
goodwill or reputation.").
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universality, is concerned with ensuring the goodwill due to the
domestic mark owner and protecting that owner against potentially
harmful use of the mark by others within the domestic market.4 5
In the words of the Fifth Circuit, "trademark rights exist in each
country solely according to that country's statutory scheme ....
'It is well settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark
rights in the United States.""' In other words, the territoriality
principle assumes that each country is an insulated market in
which goodwill can be analyzed separately from any associations
a mark may carry in another country.
While the territoriality principle has long been called
"fundamental" to U.S. trademark law, some scholars have
suggested that United States courts should reconsider their use of
the principle, especially in connection with well-known foreign
marks.4 7 Others have suggested that the principle "should be
revisited in light of the globalization of markets and concomitant
changes in modem marketing practices."48 Whether the principle
of territoriality is critiqued through the lens of the well-known
mark doctrine and its inconsistent application in the United States
or through the lens of modem market realities, there is ample room
for debate.
There is an inherent logic to territoriality in that it comports
with an intuitive sense that each region should prescribe its own
laws.4 9 As one author explained, "[f]aw is contextual, and
geography is an important part of context.""o The concept of
45 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29:1.
46 Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599
(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc.,
495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974)).
47 See, e.g., Lockridge, supra note I1, at 1392.
48 Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 889 (emphasis added); see also Leaffer, The New
World, supra note 16, at 28, ("[T]he territorial model of trademark law in such a world is
an anachronism and, from a practical standpoint, hardly exists in its pure form.").
49 Cf Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Law ofNations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 451 n.20 (2011) ("Historically the law of nations
recognized that 'every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within
its own territory."' (quoting Justice Story in COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, AND
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND
JUDGMENTS 19 (Hilliard, Gray 1834))).
50 Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 892.
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territoriality makes sense, to some extent, where a mark has a local
reputation.51 For example, consider a plumbing company that may
have a fairly limited geographic range of service and may not
advertise predominantly on the internet. While there may be
online discussion of the service through a consumer review site
such as Yelp,52 the mark itself may be best known to the local
community. A subsequent user would be properly precluded from
using the mark in the same community.5 3
For many larger companies, however, trademarks often
become well-known through the borderless internet rather than
purely through local advertising.54 Consumers learn about brands
and develop impressions of marks through online interactions."
The vast increase in the use of social media marketing, search
engine optimization, and related online marketing efforts speaks to
the primary importance of internet advertising for most large
corporations.5 6 Because internet advertising by its nature crosses
borders, the concept of territoriality may have become irrelevant to
well-known marks, in some applications.
51 See LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1411 (noting how consumer familiarity with a
trademark engenders goodwill toward the company, and this goodwill in turn contributes
to the company's success in business).
52 YELP, www.yelp.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
53 See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 30:10 (discussing preliminary injunctive
relief).
54 See Lisa Williford Arthur, eBay Becomes a Girl's New Best Friend as the
Second Circuit Sidesteps the Nominative Fair Use Doctrine, Leaving Tiffany to Police
Counterfeits in the Online Marketplace, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 29, 50 (2010)
("Because the Internet makes it so easy to create an article, a webpage, or even an
advertisement, ordinary trademarks can become famous overnight, thus making
trademark liability more frequent and this distinction [between famous and ordinary
trademarks] less important.").
55 See Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MiNN. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2010)
("[Trademarks on the internet] are no longer primarily expressive; they are functional in
the most mechanical sense of the term; they have become a form of computer code.").
56 Cf Dan Malachowski, Comment, 'Username Jacking' in Social Media: Should
Celebrities and Brand Owners Recover from Social Networking Sites When Their Social
Media Usernames Are Stolen?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 223, 225-26 (2010) ("[S]ocial
networking has changed the way in which brands and celebrities market themselves and
how consumers make purchase decisions.").
57 See Georgios Zekos, State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace
Jurisdiction, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 5 (2007) (describing how the internet does
not fit into traditional spatial categories defining origin and source).
92012]1
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The debate over the extent to which courts should apply the
territoriality principle in an internet-driven marketplace is
informed by the analogous issue of internet-based personal
jurisdiction." For at least fifteen years, federal courts have
debated the extent to which internet transactions might satisfy the
minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction.5 9 In 1997,
the Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.6 o decision
established a sliding scale test to determine whether internet use is
sufficient to exert personal jurisdiction over a defendant.6 '
Although courts have varied widely in their reactions to the "Zippo
test," and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, there is a
growing consensus that personal jurisdiction may, in some cases,
be based on internet activity alone.62 If courts can extend personal
jurisdiction on the basis of internet use, then it makes sense to ask
whether exceptions to the territoriality principle should be made
for well-known foreign marks.
Although the problems with applying the territoriality
principle are meaningful, especially in light of modern consumer
behavior and the rapid transmission of information, solutions to
the U.S. issue of territoriality have long been in place. 63  Early
treaties are grounded in territorial protections, and both early and
modern agreements acknowledge an exception for well-known
marks and provide for their multinational recognition.64 Article
6bis of the Paris Convention requires the protection of well-known
marks across national borders that are used for identical or similar
58 See id. at 4 (discussing how to determine personal jurisdiction, a concept largely
based on territorial notions, concerning the internet, a virtual space devoid of physical
definitions).
59 See, e.g., Barrett v. Catacomb Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (1999) (holding
that a psychiatrist suing a rival for defamation had failed to establish personal
jurisdiction because, among other considerations, the plaintiff did not demonstrate the
defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction through her
internet activity).
60 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
61 Id. at 1124.
62 See, e.g., Illinois v. Hemi Group, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
Zippo test yet finding personal jurisdiction on the basis of website operation); Dudnikov
v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding
personal jurisdiction established through eBay auction).
63 See Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1352.
64 Id. at 1358, 1361.
10 [Vol. XXXVIII
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goods and are liable to create consumer confusion. In doing so,
it provides a way for the owners of well-known marks to protect
those marks abroad, even when they could not demonstrate actual
foreign use of those marks.6 6 Article 6bis has been most
influential for countries that base trademark priority on
registration, rather than use, because it has otherwise been difficult
to obtain relief against a mark holder in another nation where the
senior mark holder has not registered.6 7
Over ninety years later, the landmark TRIPS Agreement
extended this famous marks protection to well-known service
marks as well as to goods and services that are dissimilar to the
well-known mark.6 1 Furthermore, a non-binding joint
recommendation by the Paris Union and the World Intellectual
Property Organization affirmed that a mark would be protected in
a country where it is well-known regardless of whether the mark is
registered or used in that country.69 The joint declaration also
offered guidance to help determine whether a mark qualifies as
well-known.70 Factors include the degree of public recognition of
65 The relevant treaty language states:
The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits,
or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration,
and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an
imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in
that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also
apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such
well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
Paris Convention, supra note 10, art. 6bis(1).
66 Id
67 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29:62.
68 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 16. Article 16(2) extends the Paris
Convention's treatment of famous marks to services. Id. Article 16(3) extends the Paris
Convention's treatment of famous marks to dissimilar goods. Id.
69 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on The Protection of Well-
Known Marks adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property
Association (WIPO), arts. 2, 3, adopted September 20-29, 1999, WIPO Doc. No.
A/34/13 [hereinafter Joint Recommendation]. For a further examination of the Joint
Recommendation, see Maxim Grinberg, The WIPO Joint Recommendation Protecting
Well-Known Marks and the Forgotten Goodwill, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2005).
70 Joint Recommendation, supra note 69, art. 2.
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the mark, the duration and location of registrations, and the
commercial value associated with the mark."1
The United States has signed both the Paris Convention and
TRIPS, each of which include well-known marks exceptions to the
general territoriality rule of the Lanham Act.7 2 When a nation is a
signatory to a treaty, one would generally expect national
compliance with the treaty's terms.73 However, due to a technical
legal requirement that a treaty be "self-executing," a signed treaty
is not guaranteed the effect of U.S. domestic law.74 The Paris
Convention and TRIPS are non-self-executing treaties, 5 and do
not become effective as domestic law until Congress enacts
implementing legislation. 76 In contrast, self-executing treaties do
not require separate domestic legislation. 77
Although the United States is a signatory, Congress has not
fully incorporated provisions of TRIPS and the Paris Convention
into the United States Code. Some commentators recommend
7' Id.
72 See Bella 1. Safro & Thomas S. Keaty, What's in a Name? Protection of Well-
Known Trademarks Under International and National Law, 6 TutL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 33, 53 (2004) (examining the specific laws governing the protection of famous
trademarks in the United States and other countries).
73 See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (designating all
treaties as "international law commitments"); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 3 (2002) ("The United
States has an important national interest in ensuring compliance with its treaty
obligations .... ).
74 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504 ("In sum, while treaties 'may comprise
international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-
executing" and is ratified on these terms."' (quoting Igartua De La Rosa v. United States,
417 F.3d 145, 150 (C.A.1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.))).
75 See Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should
Consider Article 6bis of the Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the
Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 363, 364 (2006); Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 940;
LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1385.
76 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-05. For a more in-depth examination and
criticism of non-self-executing treaties, see Sloss, supra note 73.
77 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-05. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) (examining the constitutionality of the distinction
between "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties).
78 See James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 451-53, 488-89 (2009) ("It is up to
Congress, not the federal judiciary, to incorporate the famous marks doctrine into federal
12
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that Congress amend the Lanham Act to incorporate the Paris
Convention and TRIPS; some judges already treat these
agreements as equivalent to domestic legislation.7 9 Others argue
that the Lanham Act should be read to include article 6bis of the
Paris Convention without any need for Congressional action."o
These reforms have not occurred."' Without full execution of
these treaties, the law in the United States remains uncertain
regarding the protection of well-known foreign marks.8 2 Courts
have thus been left to determine the extent to which the Lanham
Act incorporates principles embedded in these international
treaties.
B. The Uncertain Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks
The struggle over the incorporation of the Paris Convention
and TRIPS into American law has created fertile ground for
conflicting court rulings on the protection of well-known foreign
marks. The first appellate decision on the issue was Grupo
Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co.84 The case involved a large and
well-established Mexican grocery chain named "Gigante," which
opened in 1962 as a single shop in Mexico City and grew to over
one hundred stores by 1991." While Grupo Gigante operated no
stores in the United States, six of its stores were located near the
U.S.-Mexico border, including two in Tijuana, just south of San
Diego.8 6 In 1991, before Grupo Gingante expanded its operations
into the United States, Michael Dallo began operating a grocery
store in San Diego under the name "Gigante Market". 87 Later that
year, Michael's brother Chris opened a second store in San Diego
trademark law.").
79 See, e.g., id. at 488-89; Dariush Keyhani, Bulova Wrongly Decided: A Case
Against Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. 33, 37 (2007).
80 See e.g., Barker, supra note 75, at 384-89.
81 See Faris, supra note 78, at 488-89; Barker, supra note 75, at 384-89.
82 See Faris, supra note 78, at 488 (describing the lack of conclusive law on well-
known marks exceptions in the United States)
83 See Barker, supra note 75, at 373-84.
84 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
85 Id. at 1091.
86 Id
87 Id
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under the same name." Grupo Gigante unsuccessfully confronted
the Dallos' use of the word "Gigante" in 1998, and registered the
"Gigante" mark with the state of California that June; the Dallos'
did likewise the next month." Grupo Gigante opened its first store
in the United States in 1999, followed by two in 2000; each was
called "Gigante," just as in Mexico.9 o In July 1999, the Dallos'
sent Grupo Gigante a cease-and-desist letter demanding they
discontinue their use of the name "Gigante," and Grupo Gigante
responded by filing a lawsuit claiming trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act.91
Under the traditional application of the territoriality principle
of trademark law, Dallo's rights to the "Gigante" mark would have
trumped Grupo Gigante's in the United States.92 Priority of
trademark in the United States depends solely upon use of that
mark within U.S. territory; the Dallos were the first to use the
mark in the United States." Grupo Gigante's earlier use of the
trademark abroad would not override Dallo's use of Gigante in the
United States.94
The court ruled, however, that there was a well-known mark
exception to the territoriality principle in the United States.95
Specifically, the court concluded that a foreign mark may qualify
for the well-known mark exception if the mark owner shows "that
a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American
market [are] familiar with the foreign mark."96 Courts should
consider factors such as whether the American copying of the
foreign mark was intentional and whether American consumers
are likely to think that they are patronizing the foreign enterprise
in the United States.97 The court said:
While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1092.
90 Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1091.
91 Id. at 1091.
92 Id. at 1093.
93 Id
94 Id. at 1093.
95 Id at 1093-94.
96 Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098.
97 Id
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doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An
absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception
would promote consumer confusion and fraud. Commerce
crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants, so do people....
There can be no justification for using trademark law to fool
immigrants into thinking that they are buying from the store they
liked back home.98
According to the court, this exception allows, in certain cases,
foreign nationals who use their trademarks in foreign markets to
receive protection in the U.S. domestic market even though the
mark has not yet been registered or used there.99 The court
remanded the district court's decision with instructions to
reevaluate the claim in light of the famous marks exception to the
territoriality principle.'o
This issue arose again three years later in the Second Circuit,
in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.'o' ITC is an Indian company that
operates a restaurant called "Bukhara" in New Delhi.'02 Situated
inside a five-star hotel, since its opening in 1977, Bukhara has
gained an international reputation, named one of the world's fifty
best restaurants by a London magazine.'03 ITC expanded the
Bukhara brand by opening more restaurants around the world,
including in the United States.'0 4 In 1986, ITC opened a Bukhara
restaurant in Manhattan.'o In 1987, it opened a Chicago
restaurant through a franchise agreement and registered its
trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.'0 6
The New York restaurant remained open for only five years.107 In
1997, ITC cancelled the franchise agreement in Chicago.'0o Since
that time, ITC had not used the Bukhara mark in any restaurant in
98 Id. at 1094.
99 Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094-95.
100 Id. at 1098-99.
101 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
102 Id. at 142-43.
103 Id. at 143 n.4.
104 Id. at 143.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 143.
108 Id.
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the United States.109
In 1999, owners of Punchgini, Inc., opened the "Bukhara
Grill" in New York City."o The restaurant mimicked ITC's logos,
uniforms, menu style, and d6cor."' Some of the owners had
worked at the original Bukhara restaurant in New Delhi.1 2 One
owner of Punchgini admitted in his deposition that since no
Bukhara restaurant existed in New York, "we just thought we
[would] take the name."' 13
After sporadic written communications between the parties,
ITC sued, claiming trademark infringement and other claims." 4
At trial, ITC argued that the court should recognize the well-
known marks exception to the territoriality principle as was done
by the Ninth Circuit in Gigante."' ITC submitted that the Lanham
Act incorporated the exception present in the Paris Convention
and TRIPS."'6 After reviewing the origin and development of the
well-known marks doctrine,"' the court concluded that the Paris
Convention creates no rights beyond what is already provided in
the Lanham Act and that there is no evidence of Congressional
intent to incorporate a well-known marks exception."' As a result,
ITC could not prevent the former employees of Bukhara from
using the Bukhara trademark in the United States.l' The court
then affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs Lanham Act claim.120
The ITC decision resulted in a circuit split between two
influential jurisdictions. 2 ' The Ninth Circuit (author of the
109 Id. ITC did use a "Dal Bukhara" mark to sell ready-to-serve food products in
2003. Id.
110 Id. at 144.
III Id
112 Id.
113 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted).
'14 Id. at 144-45.
'15 Id. at 161.
116 Id. at 161 .
117 Id. at 156-62.
118 Id at 161-62.
119 ITCLtd., 482 F.3d at 165.
120 Id
121 Compare Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th
Cir. 2004) (recognizing that there is a famous mark exception to the territoriality
principle in federal law), with ITC, 482 F.3d at 172 (ruling that Congress has not
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Gigante case) is influential in part due to its geography.122  The
circuit governs nine western states including California and has
been influential in the development of trademark law in such areas
as survey evidence and internet protection. 12 3 The Second Circuit
(author of the ITC case), by contrast, governs only three states
(Connecticut, Vermont and New York). 124 However, the Second
Circuit, as noted in one sample, has published nearly one-third of
trademark infringement opinions in the United States, creating for
itself disproportionate influence over the development of
trademark jurisprudence.' 25 The Second Circuit is also responsible
for developing the original list of factors that determine whether
trademark infringement has occurred.126  Although other federal
circuits are under no obligation to follow a different circuit's
approach, other appellate jurisdictions are likely to follow either
the Second or the Ninth Circuit's lead, thus further entrenching the
disagreement.
The obvious solution would have been for the Supreme Court
to resolve the question. The Supreme Court, however, declined to
hear ITC's appeal.'2 7 Denying certiorari left the issue of when
well-known foreign marks will be recognized in the United States
unresolved and festering as a circuit split.'28 The next section of
incorporated the famous marks doctrine from the Paris Convention, nor TRIPS into
federal law).
122 Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United
States District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/
CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Geographic Boundaries]; see
generally Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000) ("The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is by far the largest federal court of appeals of both population served
and number ofjudgeships.").
123 See generally Robert H. Thomburg, Trademark Survey Evidence: Review of
Current Trends in the Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 715,
718 (2005) (reviewing current issues inherent in using trademark surveys at trial in light
of the Ninth Circuit's "unique treatment and use of survey evidence").
124 Geographic Boundaries, supra note 122.
125 See Jerome Gilson, The Lanham Act: Time for a Face-Lifit?, 92 TRADEMARK
REP. 1013, 1018 (2002) (summarizing what are commonly known as the Polaroid
factors).
126 Id.
127 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
827 (2007).
128 See Alexis Weissberger, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An
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this article discusses the global implications of that circuit split,
which could have far reaching effects beyond a simple dispute
over trademark ownership.
III. The Non-Enforcement of Well-Known Foreign Marks: The
Potential for Global Retribution
Uncertain legal rules, such as those created by a circuit split,
create problems for domestic and foreign firms doing business in
the United States.129  Uncertain rules promote costly and time-
consuming litigation between firms unclear about their legal rights
or obligations.130  Duplicative contracting may be necessary
because what may be permissible in one jurisdiction may not be
permissible in another unless a "choice-of-law" clause is
incorporated.13 ' Uncertain rules also promote overly conservative
behavior by firms concerned about triggering regulatory scrutiny
from authorities. 13 2 The result could be a chilling effect whereby
companies refrain from engaging in otherwise legal behavior for
fear of triggering needless litigation from rivals.133 Burdens
imposed by these spillover effects force firms to act at a
suboptimal level of efficiency, passing costs along to the
consumer.13 4
The disagreement between the ITC and Grupo Gigante cases
represents more than a routine circuit split. If courts decline to
fully respect well-known foreign marks in the United States, it
places carefully developed global trademarks in jeopardy.' ITC,
International Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine,
24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 742-44 (2006).
129 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966-67 (1984).
130 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, Uncertainty of Law and the
Legal Process, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 627, 637-39 (2007).
131 See generally Richard J. Bauerfeld, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in
Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy of Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1659 (1982) (discussing the cons of choice of law clauses).
132 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 129, at 966-69.
133 Id. at 1001-02.
134 Id at 966-69.
135 Cf U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INVESTIGATION No. 332-519, CHINA: EFFECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE
U.S. ECONoMY 3-1 to 3-12 (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4226.pdf (explaining how the lack of intellectual property
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for example, carefully cultivated its "Bukhara" trademark over a
period of decades. 13 6  As a result of this careful cultivation,
Bukhara managed to be rated one of the top restaurants in the
world.'3 7 Diners patronizing such elite restaurants are likely to be
well-travelled and recognize the Bukhara mark.138 The ITC
decision enables an upstart to deliberately poach the name and use
ITC's goodwill to create a rival restaurant. 3 9 Diners visiting the
new Bukhara restaurant might encounter inferior food or service
and associate that lower quality with the Bukhara name. Such a
result would erode what companies so carefully try to construct: a
well-known and respected brand readily recalled in the minds of
its relevant consumers.'4 0
The disagreement about how to treat well-known foreign
marks not only threatens the assets of foreign companies wanting
to do business in the United States, but it also erodes the
legitimacy of the United States and its role in supporting a strong
global intellectual property regime. The United States has gone to
great lengths to induce nations, especially developing nations, to
comply with TRIPS and adopt Western-style intellectual property
rights over the past fifteen years.'4 ' During the 1980s and the
early 1990s, the United States aggressively lobbied the Indian
government, among others, to adopt strong Western-style
intellectual property rights.14 2  By linking trade and intellectual
protection in China for U.S. firms damages U.S. global marks).
136 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
137 Id
138 See 4A's, The 2011 Mendelsohn Affluent Survey, 4A's MEDIA MATTERS 8 (Mar.
14, 2012), http://www.aaaa.org/news/bulletins/Documents/7381.pdf (describing general
habits of affluent Americans).
139 See Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Callfor
American Courts to Grant Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85, 97-98 (2009) (describing how new companies could
legally use another company's mark under ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 143).
140 See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89, 98 (1993) ("Trademarks can
operate as both a valuable source of goodwill and a key marketing tool in foreign
markets.").
141 See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 317, 323-29 (2006) (describing how America used its
resources to influence Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
142 See id. at 322-25 (explaining that the United States recruited European trade
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property, the U.S. government sought to impose (or imposed)
economic consequences on national governments that refused to
adhere to the proposed new rights.'4 3 In the case of India, the
United States exerted pressure by way of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).144 This external economic pressure
eventually overcame internal Indian resistance to the new regime,
and India ended its opposition.'4 5 From an Indian perspective, the
United States' enormous pressure to strengthen intellectual
property rights in India (largely in favor of American firms) seems
duplicitous when an Indian enterprise that manages to penetrate
the U.S. market receives an unenthusiastic response from
American courts.14 6
A. The Inherent Vulnerability of US. Trademarks Abroad
and the Exacerbating Effect of Weak Well-Known Mark
Enforcement
Even if Congress and the American courts were punctiliously
compliant toward their international obligations, U.S. trademarks
would remain a vulnerable American corporate asset abroad.147
Trademark owners are uniquely susceptible to political, economic,
and historical forces, all of which create disincentives for foreign
governments to aggressively defend them.148
partners and Japan to make intellectual property protection an issue in negotiations).
143 See id at 323 ("Developing countries, led by BRIC nations of India and Brazil,
resisted American efforts to link trade and intellectual property rights.").
144 See id. at 328-29 ("The United States pressured India to agree to the negotiation
of TRIPS through its influence over International Monetary Fund assistance to the 1989
Indian economic crisis.").
145 See id. at 329 ("India abandoned its opposition to TRIPS in order to maintain
badly needed U.S. funding and trade access.").
146 Cf Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions,
18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 494 (1996) (calling the United States and other
western countries economically "hypocritical" for condemning China for not stopping
trademark infringement).
147 See Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual
Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 63-66 (1994) (explaining that U.S.
trademarks may remain vulnerable because foreign cultures have a different idea of
ownership leading to a comparatively lenient enforcement philosophy).
148 See David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable
Anticipation Standard is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark
Liability in the Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, I 63 (2011) (arguing
that a trademark owner's expertise isolates her, thus making her vulnerable to transient
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Politically, legislators have little direct incentive to make
defense of foreign trademark rights a priority.149 Although foreign
mark holders can exert influence through economic pressure,"o
foreign corporations and the workers they employ in their home
country cannot participate in the domestic legislative process."'
By contrast, local manufacturing interests that employ local
workers and have close connections to the government can exert
significant pressure against strong protective legislation of foreign
marks.'52 Strong foreign trademark protection, and the associated
financial benefits associated with that protection, could be painted
to legislators as having a negative impact on the domestic
economy.1 53 An emerging foreign rival augmented by trademark
protection can hurt the market share of domestic producers.'5 4
Those losses may be associated with closed factories and
layoffs.' 55
Furthermore, developing nations in particular are faced with a
variety of pressing social ills. It is not unreasonable that
legislative interest might be more focused on issues such as
poverty and civil strife than the intangible rights of foreigners.'
If local competitors perceive foreign marks as imposing an unfair
advantage on foreign companies in domestic markets, trademark
legislation protection might be the first avenue of legislative
response.' This response might not be as drastic as rescinding
influences).
149 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 135, at 5-30 ("China's 2002
Government Procurement Law and subsequent implementing policies give priority to
'local' goods and services .... ).
150 See Bird, supra note 141, at 325 (attributing TRIPS to a corporate coalition led
predominately by American companies).
151 C.f U.S. CONST. amends. XV, § 1, XIX, XXVI, § 1 (reserving the right to vote
for U.S. citizens above the age of eighteen).
152 See Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges
for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 371, 381 (2008) (describing how state
agents bow to local pressures regarding trademark enforcement).
153 See id. at 384-86 (explaining two cases in which Chinese courts found for
Starbucks and imposed fines on domestic companies).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Bird, supra note 141, at 323 (explaining that international trade may come
second depending on domestic issues).
157 See id. at 345 (describing how the United States used legislative action against
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legislation; rather, updated or strengthened trademark legislation
might be delayed, placed in a dead-end committee, or mired in
unproductive procedural wrangling."' Regardless of whether
legislative concern is focused in other directions or legislators
actively seek to please their constituents, the result would likely be
the same: delayed or diminished legislative interest in furthering
foreign trademark protection. 159
Certain countries, particularly those with developing
economies, might perceive licensors of foreign marks as
exploiting local businesses and taking advantage of vulnerable
consumers.'6 0 Consumer loyalty to aggressively advertised foreign
trademarks can arguably not only disadvantage local businesses,
but also suppress traditional consumption habits that better sustain
long-term health.' 6 ' Illiterate consumers might be more easily
swayed by sophisticated foreign advertising.'6 2 Domestic interests
might also fear economic pressure from wealthy foreign interests
who would use their powerful brand equity to force local licensees
into accepting onerous contract terms.' The perceived result
would be that foreign trademark rights impede the economic self-
sufficiency of brand-dependent emerging markets.'6 4 Local firms
India when India failed to comply with trade agreements).
158 See id. at 348 (describing a cycle of delay utilized by India in response to U.S.
pressure to strengthen intellectual property rights).
159 See id. at 319 (describing the two types of responses a country coerced into
protecting international trademarks might have as either (1) retaliatory or (2) delayed).
160 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 284 (1991) [hereinafter Leaffer,
Protecting United States] ("Some developing countries have displayed hostility toward
trademark protection in their substantive law. This attitude is nurtured by a fear that
foreign licensors of trademarks exploit both local businesses and vulnerable
consumers.").
161 Cf Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53
EMORY L.J. 1645, 1722-23 (2004) (describing distrust over globalization and the
influence of multinational activities on domestic food politics).
162 See John P. Spitals, The UNCTAD Report on the Role of Trademarks in
Developing Countries: An Analysis, 2 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 369, 380 (1981).
163 See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284 ("Foreign
licensors are perceived as having superior bargaining power, permitting them to impose
terms unfavorable to the local licensee.").
164 See id. ("[L]ocal authorities believe that the increased use of trademarks will
become an insurmountable obstacle to achieving economic self-sufficiency."); Samantha
D. Slotkin, Trademark Piracy in Latin America: A Case Study on Reebok International
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may believe that strong foreign trademark protection would make
it difficult to convince consumers already accustomed to buying
foreign goods to switch to local brands."' As a result, foreign
trademarks may be perceived as having a suppressive effect on the
establishment of local trademarks, a position supported by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.166
Finally, historical events also encourage an environment that is
hostile, or at least indifferent, to foreign trademark protection.
Traditionally, trademark protection has been exploited only by
firms from the wealthiest nations. 167  By 1974, half of all
trademarks registered in developing countries were owned by
foreigners. 168 Furthermore, foreign trademark owners have been
known to abuse local licensees. 169 After negotiating an onerous
license agreement, the foreign licensor sometimes allows the local
licensee to build up the licensor's local business.o7 1 Just as the
licensee expects to finally receive significant returns on its
investment, the foreign licensor arbitrarily terminates the license
and reaps the benefits of the licensee's hard work.171 Today, firms
in many developing economies own valuable trademarks that can
compete with virtually any brand that American firms can offer. 172
Ltd., 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 671, 675 (1996) ("Increased protection also
makes self-sufficiency extremely difficult for developing countries dependent on
technology importation .... .").
165 See Slotkin, supra note 164, at 675 ("Even if a local company decides to market
locally manufactured goods, becoming established and gaining a market share may be
difficult because consumers are accustomed to foreign goods.").
166 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284.
167 See Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark Protection in Today's Global
Village: Looking Beyond GATT's Uruguay Round Toward Global Trademark
Harmonization and Centralization, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 71-72 (1995)
(arguing that developed nations have established trademark protection laws while
developing nations are creating such law).
168 Spitals, supra note 162, at 378.
169 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
170 See William H. Ball, Jr., Attitudes of Developing Countries to Trademarks, 74
TRADEMARK ReP. 160, 163 (1984) ("This gives rise to the oft-cited example of the
licensee in Peru, Yemen or wherever, who has worked for years to build up his foreign
licensor's local business. Just as success is finally in his grasp, he is terminated
arbitrarily.").
I71 Id.
172 See Making a Name for Themselves: Emerging Markets Are Now Creating
Highly Valuable Brands, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2010,
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In spite of this, the long-standing gross disparity in trademark
ownership, along with incidents of abusive behavior, can cement
the notion that trademark law remains mainly a tool for foreign
advancement at the expense of domestic interests.
Given these political, economic, and historical factors, it
would not be surprising for foreign governments-particularly
those of developing nations-to view protection of U.S.
trademarks with a degree of skepticism. National legislators
already predisposed toward their own domestic mark holders
would see little reason to support the protection of American
trademarks when U.S. law may not protect foreign marks."' Non-
enforcement may also reinforce the already established view that
intellectual property protection is simply another form of
economic colonialism by which developed nations seek to subvert
the interests of the poorer nations in favor of their own.174
http://www.economist.com/node/16003537. This article comments:
Although American technology firms-Google, IBM, Apple and Microsoft-
grab the top four places, the list [of the 100 most valuable brands] contains 13
brands from big emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Mexico),
compared with just one in the consultancy's [Millward Brown Optimor] 2006
league table.... Among the rich-world brands that have dropped out of the
league are KFC, Yahoo!, and Ikea. Those taking their place include Baidu, a
Chinese internet firm, ICICI, an Indian bank and Petrobras, a Brazilian oil giant.
If you don't know them yet, you will.
Id.
173 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
174 See generally Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-so-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property
Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 16-17 (1998).
In particular, as between the developed nations of the North and the less
developed countries of the South, increasing numbers of scholars have been
questioning whether the flow of benefits of international intellectual property
protection, which are part of the whole "free trade" package, may be skewed to
the advantage of the economies, cultures, and nations of the North.
Id. See also Clark W. Lackert, Famous Marks: Dilution from an International
Perspective, in ANNUAL ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 154 (PLI Pat.,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 176, 1997) ("IP protection is viewed as a form of economic
colonialism using trademarks as a form of exploitation.").
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B. The Potential Reaction ofForeign Governments in the
Global Environment
Trademarks already stand on shaky ground.' 5  Foreign
governments might not sit idly by if well-known marks from their
countries do not receive full protection in the United States.'
Such a reaction might occur in a global forum where multinational
disputes are raised and resolved.'77 These fora could range from
international organizations that resolve disputes to a court of
global opinion that validates one's national position.
One of the most high-profile methods of resolving
multinational disputes is through the dispute resolution forum
provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO)." Typically, a
member nation brings a complaint before the WTO's dispute
resolution body alleging that some practice violates TRIPS or
another treaty regime.'7 9  After a hearing, the body issues a
decision and the loser may appeal.' Many believe the WTO
settlement forum is particularly effective because it authorizes the
winning party to enforce the body's decision by withdrawing trade
concessions against the offending nation.'8 '
Unfortunately, to the extent that the United States has
interacted with global institutions on the topic of trademarks, its
175 See Doris Estelle Long, Rebooting Trademarks for the Twenty-First Century, 49
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 517, 524 (2011) (explaining the subtleties behind a trademark
infringement suit).
176 Anthony P. Valach, Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent Holders and
Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 175
(2005).
'77 Id.
178 See Alexandra R. Harrington, They Fought for Trade but Did Trade Win?: An
Analysis of the Trends Among Trade Disputes Brought by WTO Member States Before
the Dispute Resolution Body, 16 MicH. ST. J. INT'L L. 315, 319-23 (2007) and Alain J.
Lapter, The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take it
Seriously? A TRIPS Analysis, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 217, 226-38 (2005), for a
discussion of the impact of the WTO dispute resolution process.
179 The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement ofDisputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 112, 126 (1994).
180 Id. art. 16 § 4.
181 Id. art. 21 § 5. See also C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons From the
First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 315 (2007)
(explaining that the prevailing party can enforce the agreement through the DSB).
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behavior has not always been admirable. The United States faced
a trademark-related dispute before the WTO in "United States -
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998."l82 In this
dispute, the European Communities challenged Section 211 of the
U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act, known as the "Bacardi Bill,"
which prevented Cuban nationals from registering or renewing the
trademark of any product whose assets were confiscated as a part
of the Cuban revolution.'" Ostensibly a measure to punish acts of
the Castro regime, this last minute addition to a 4000 page bill was
more likely the result of a lobbying effort by Bacardi Rum to
prevent French-Cuban rival Havana Club Rum from competing in
the United States.184
Reversing a contrary panel decision, the WTO appellate body
concluded that Section 211 violated the national treatment and
most-favored nation obligations under TRIPS and the Paris
Convention.'18  According to the WTO's summary of the case, full
compliance has not occurred and Section 211 remains in force.'86
Meanwhile, Bacardi has launched its own Havana Club Rum
brand in the United States.' In August 2011, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld Bacardi's right to use the
182 Panel Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, 6 WT/DSl76/AB/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Panel Report 2001],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/1 76r e.pdf (explaining that the
European Communities' complaint against the United States is that § 211(b) of the OAA
violates trademark agreements).
183 Kathryn B. Codd, Note, Betting on the Wrong Horse: The Detrimental Effect of
Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling Dispute on the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GA TS), 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 941, 960 (2007).
184 See Michael Riley, Comment, Cigars and Rum: Hazardous to the Health of
Intellectual Property Law?: How the Cohiba Cigar and Havana Rum Cases Reveal a
'Carve-Out'for Intellectual Property Disputes with a Cuban Nexus, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 457, 466 (2007) ("Though Bacardi is based in Bermuda, it enlisted its
Miami-based subsidiary to persuade Florida Senator Connie Mack to insert a provision
into the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act -
Section 211, which has become known as the 'Bacardi Bill."').
185 See U.S. Panel Report 2001, supra note 182, at 115-16 (finding § 211
inconsistent with a number of articles of TRIPS).
186 See Dispute Settlement, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DS176 (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter WTO Section 211 Dispute]
(lacking any mention of Section 211 having been repealed), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/cases_e/dsl76_e.htm.
187 Riley, supra note 184, at 465.
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Havana Club name in the United States over the objections of
Pemod Ricard USA, LLC, which sells Havana Club Rum
elsewhere in the world.'"
The WTO could be the forum in which further challenges arise
regarding the protection of trademarks. For example, in "World
Trade Organization, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry,"'8 9 the European Communities and other
nations asserted that an Indonesian system offering special tax and
duty exemptions to certain Indonesian motor vehicle trademark
owners violated TRIPS.'9 0 In another dispute, a group of nations
led by Australia challenged the European Communities' lack of
protection for trademarks and geographical indications for
agricultural products and foodstuffs.'9 '
In addition to using the WTO to settle trademark-related
disputes, nations could also use the retaliatory threat of WTO legal
action as leverage in negotiations with the United States. 9 2 Brazil
did this by enacting a compulsory licensing statute that would
forbid the use of any patent right unless the patent holder
manufactured the subject of the patent in Brazil within three years
from the patent granting date.' 93 The United States responded by
188 Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 243 (3d Cir.
2011) (upholding the district court's holding allowing Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., to use the
name "Havana Club" on its rum). See also Don Jeffrey, Bacardi's 'Havana Club' Rum
Name Not False Advertising, Appeals Court Says, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2011, 2:22 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-04/bacardi-s-havana-club-rum-name-not-
false-advertising-appeals-court-says.html (explaining that Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., is
allowed to use "Havana Club" on its rum).
189 Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/54r00.pdf.
190 Id. at 2.
191 Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290fR (Mar.
15, 2005), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/
tradoc_122747.pdf.
192 See Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 283,
312-15 (2008) (describing Brazil and India's use of the WTO legal system to influence
the United States).
193 Anthony P. Valach, Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent Holders and
Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 175
(2005).
2012] 27
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
bringing a complaint before the WTO alleging that the law
violated TRIPS because it gave preference to local patents.'9 4
Brazil quickly retaliated by filing its own WTO complaint alleging
those portions of the United States Code requiring U.S.
manufacture of certain products made with government funding
also violated TRIPS.'95  Likely sensing opportunity, India
intervened on Brazil's behalf, claiming that it had a significant
interest in the case.196 Brazil's retaliatory action combined with
savvy public relations campaigning by Brazilian ministers resulted
in the United States withdrawing its WTO complaint.' 97
Smaller nations could potentially use the WTO complaint
system to achieve favorable results. During the 1990s, Antigua, a
traditionally poor nation, discovered newfound wealth by targeting
the United States with internet gambling operations.'9 8 Pressure
from the United States forced oversight and restrictions, triggering
the industry's flight and leaving ten percent of the total Antiguan
workforce jobless."'9 Antigua filed a complaint with the WTO,
alleging that the U.S. ban on remote access gambling and
payments violated its obligations under the General Agreement on
Trade and Services (GATS).2 00 The United States has not yet
complied with the WTO's decision.2 0' The WTO dispute system
allows the successful party to impose economic sanctions against a
non-compliant state.202 Antigua's economic power is small
194 Id. at 176-77.
195 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 313.
196 See id. ("India also wished to join Brazil in its request for consultations
regarding U.S. law. . . .").
197 See id. at 314 ("Brazil's counter-campaign combined with global public
pressure forced the United States to withdraw its complaint from the WTO.").
198 See Codd, supra note 183, at 946-47 (explaining Jay Cohen's internet gambling
operations centered in Antigua that generated millions of dollars of revenue).
199 Id. at 947.
200 See Dispute Settlement, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Better Services, WT/DS285 (Feb. 1, 2002) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/cases e/ds285_e.htm.
201 Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-Commerce and Other Computer
Related Issues: Current Developments in Liability On-line, Business Method Patents and
Software Distribution, Licensing and Copyright Protection Questions, in PRODUCT
DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING, 541, 559 (2011); Codd, supra note 183, at 953-54.
202 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
art. 22: Compensation and Suspension of Concessions, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
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compared to the United States. 203 However, if it were authorized
to suspend its obligations under TRIPS by the WTO, the violation
would give, at least in theory, a small nation like Antigua power to
act against the United States, an economic powerhouse.2 04
WTO-backed legal sanctions incur double vulnerability when
well-known foreign marks are not enforced. 205 The sanctions are
not limited to well-known U.S. marks in the complaining country,
although those marks are an obvious target. 206 The WTO actually
authorizes cross-retaliation, which means that TRIPS non-
compliance in one industry can be punished with a suspension of
concessions in an entirely unrelated industry.207 As a result, non-
protection of well-known foreign marks in the United States could
threaten foreign protection of U.S. patents and copyrights, as well
as trigger tariffs on goods and services.20 8
Conversely, WTO disputes in unrelated arenas can trigger
sanctions against well-known U.S. marks. For example, when
Brazil won its WTO claim against the United States regarding
cotton subsidies to domestic producers, Brazil requested the right
to retaliate not only against U.S. exports to Brazil but against U.S.
intellectual property assets generally. 209 American trademarks
might prove a particularly tempting target for sanction. 2 10  As
noted, American trademarks abroad may be perceived as a symbol
of Western global dominance21 1 as well as an inhibitor of local
401, 33 I.L.M. 1226.
203 Shamnad Basheer, Turning TRIPS on Its Head: An "IP Cross Retaliation"
Model for Developing Countries, 3 LAW & DEv. REv. 141, 189 (2010).
204 Id.
205 Cf id. (describing Antigua's right to "cross retaliate" by suspending its GATS
obligations in other sectors).
206 Id. at 162.
207 Basheer, supra note 203, at 145.
208 Cf id. (arguing that an intellectual property cross retaliation against the United
States may be a feasible remedy for developing countries).
209 Marcos Valadio & Nara Galeb Porto, Brazilian Update: Securitization in
Brazil, Tax Reform, and International Trade Issues, 14 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 159, 162-
63 (2008).
210 Cf Codd, supra note 183, at 957 ("Between 1995 and 2004, the United States
was the most active participant in dispute settlement, litigating as the respondent in fifty-
seven disputes . . . .").
211 See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA
1, 80-81 (2008); Amir H. Khoury, A NeoConventional Trademark Regime for
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economic progress.2 12 America's arguable non-compliance with
TRIPS on this issue makes its marks a target of symbolic
importance.2 13 If pressed on the fairness of the retaliatory action,
the complaining party could contend that sanctions against well-
known marks have the double benefit of satisfying the WTO-
authorized sanction authority as well as bringing the United States
into compliance with the global economic system, which may
benefit the global economic system as a whole.214
Whereas sanctions against American foodstuffs and important
commodities might have direct negative economic effects on the
local economy and quality of life, sanctions against well-known
trademarks are less burdensome. 2 15  Even a tiny nation such as
Antigua could readily impose a special tax on intellectual
property-related goods from the United States and combine it with
a price control mechanism to ensure that the added taxes are not
passed to the consumer.2 16 The United States is a global economic
power, and such economic power can inoculate it against the
efforts of weaker nations to force compliance. 217  Nonetheless,
well-known marks represent a tempting target for economic
sanction; American non-enforcement of such marks represents a
veritable invitation for developing and developed nations to
impose them.2 18
"Newcomer" States, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 351, 368 (2010).
212 See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284.
213 Cf Khoury, supra note 211, at 368 (describing the "distinctively Western value"
of U.S. marks).
214 Cf Basheer, supra note 203, at 141 (explaining that Antigua attempted to
impose retaliatory sanctions against the United States in order to bring it into compliance
with the international agreements on trade).
215 Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 41-43 (2011).
216 Basheer, supra note 203, at 144-46.
217 Id. at 141.
218 Cf Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years ofDisputes at the WTO, 9 COMPUTER L. REV.
& TECH. J. 455, 477 (2005) (describing the WTO complaint by the United States against
Brazil's compulsory licensing statute and Brazil's retaliation of filing its own WTO
complaint against the United States).
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C. Potential National and Local Responses to Weak
Trademark Protection
The responses by nations affected by weak U.S. trademark
protection may not simply be limited to formal adjudicative
procedures before the WTO. Non-enforcement of well-known
marks can trigger local actions that threaten the economic well-
being of global U.S. firms.2 19 Such non-enforcement, or even
unenthusiastic enforcement, may not be as visible as a WTO
proceeding, but may be just as effective as a retaliatory tool. Local
actions are harder for the U.S. government and business interests
to quickly prevent.2 20
One of the simplest responses is for governments to fail to
protect American latecomers to foreign markets.22 1 Reebok, then a
British producer of athletic footwear, endured ten years of
unsuccessful litigation in Peru, attempting to cancel registration of
pirated ownership and regain its Reebok name.2 22 When a pirate
filed an Argentine trademark application for "Hard Rock Cafe" in
1986, the true owners of the mark were ordered to cover all
references to their name on Argentinean restaurants pending a
ruling on the adverse application.2 23 At worst, the firm can be
prevented from using its own mark in a foreign market, causing
confusion in that and other markets as consumers learn of the
pirate producer through the flow of global information.224 Even if
219 See Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and Trade in
TRIPS: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven? 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 722
(1999).
220 Cf Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 281 (explaining that
developing countries either do not provide governmental enforcement for intellectual
property or provide insufficient enforcement).
221 Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations
Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in
the World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1368 (2009).
222 Gutowski, supra note 219, at 722.
223 Kathryn L. Barrett et al., International Trademark Registration and
Enforcement, in DRAFTING LICENSING AGREEMENTS 1996: A SATELLITE PROGRAM, at
207, 213 (PLI Pat., Course Handbook Ser. No. 445, 1996).
224 Cf B. Brett Heavner, iPhone Haishi i-Phone? Zhongguo Dui Chiming Shanbia
di Baohu (iPhone .Z i-phone ? Oi7)iffffif##10 P) [iPhone or i-phone?
Protection for Famous Marks in China], MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Sep. 1,
2009, at 55, available at http://www.managingip.com/pdfs/china-edition/
MIP China 0909.pdf, translated at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
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the foreign firm wins in court, it will have to spend significant
advertising revenue clearing its brand from the negative
associations entrenched by the inferior counterfeit. 225
A national legislature might also theoretically pass legislation
that impedes the influence of foreign marks.22 6 In 1976, Mexico
threatened to implement a trademark "linking law" that would
have forced all foreign trademark owners to associate their marks
with a local Mexican mark in order to use them in connection with
goods produced in Mexico.22 7 Such a law would result in a kind of
trademark expropriation that allows a local licensee to "free ride"
on the reputation of the foreign mark holder.2 28 Other nations also
tried implementing regulations in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 29  Such
linking laws have not been attempted recently, and are probably
not the looming risk they once were.230 However, such laws could
be used as a threat or as a tool to place foreign trademark
protection on the bargaining table in exchange for broader
protections of the domestic firms' intellectual property rights
abroad.23 1 Nations still retain the power to severely restrict or even
abolish the use of trademarks in their jurisdictions.2 32
Linking laws and other attempts to encumber foreign
trademarks are not imminent threats, even if U.S. courts continue
articlesdetail.aspx?news=c46de5ed-7 I e-4e5b-960a-013abd4c7d6c (explaining that
Apple cannot register the "iPhone" mark in China because of Hanwang's prior trademark
registration).
225 Cf Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance With Hiphone? Rethinking the Idea
of Social Justice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 389, 405
(2012) (providing that producers of distinctive goods must protect the economic value of
their products from associations with counterfeited items).
226 See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284-85 (describing a
Mexican law that tried to deter the effect of foreign trademarks).
227 Id
228 Id. at 285.
229 Ball, supra note 170, at 164-65.
230 Thomas J. Hoffman, International Trademark Practice, in ADVANCED SEMINAR
ON TRADEMARK LAW 1995, at 247, 324 (PLI Pat., Course Handbook Ser. No. 410, 1995).
231 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 310-12 (arguing that Brazil was able to
bargain with U.S. firms because of its intellectual property-impairing compulsory
licensing statutes).
232 See Khoury, supra note 211, at 368-70 (describing but rejecting this approach as
too costly). The notion of abolishing trademark was raised as a possibility in the early
1970s in order to reduce the price of pharmaceuticals. Id. at 369.
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to not fully recognize foreign marks protection. Article 20 of
TRIPS, for example, prohibits unjustifiable encumbrances upon
the use of trademarks in commerce. 233 This prohibition does not
necessarily mean, however, that legislative encumbering of
foreign marks would have no place as a retaliatory strategy.2 34
Countries, especially developing ones, know well that even a
threat of intellectual property-impairing legislation can bring U.S.
firms to the bargaining table, as Brazil did when its threats to
break drug company patents helped secure it an affordable price
for anti-retroviral AIDS drugs. 23 5 Furthermore, passing TRIPS's
non-compliant legislation does not necessarily trigger immediate
WTO-authorized foreign sanctions.2 36 A typical WTO dispute
lasts three years.237 Nations can further delay sanctions through
persistent renegotiation of time to comply, as the United States has
skillfully done in the Section 211 dispute discussed above.2 38
During this time, the offending legislation could remain in place,
impeding the ability of U.S. trademark holders to penetrate and
expand in foreign markets.23 9 In response, the United States could
certainly circumvent the WTO dispute resolution process and
impose sanctions unilaterally. 2 40  Such action would leave the
United States open to criticism for not adhering to the very
international legal rules that it helped create and impose on
developing nations.241 Unilateral action would thus create a whole
new set of problems regarding the legitimacy and moral authority
of American global leadership.
Governments can conflate U.S. non-compliance with TRIPS
233 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 20.
234 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 310-12.
235 Id.
236 Timothy Stostad, Note, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute
Settlement in the WTO, and its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
811, 835 (2006).
237 Id. Some disputes take longer. See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute
Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 17, 49 (2005) (describing
one WTO dispute that lasted nearly ten years).
238 See WTO Section 211 Dispute, supra note 186.
239 Cf Heavner, supra note 224, at 55 (explaining that Apple cannot market its
iPhone products until the issue with Hanwang's registered mark is resolved).
240 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 295.
241 Codd, supra note 183, at 963.
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with pressing political issues.2 42 For example, the United States
has persistently pressured China to increase enforcement efforts
against trademark pirates who copy American marks.243 Such
piracy costs U.S. firms billions of dollars annually.2" While
China has stepped up its efforts, this lobbying has provoked
responses from Beijing.2 45 The commerce minister painted U.S.
behavior as contradictory, commenting that while Washington
wants China to release political prisoners from prison, it is now
asking for more Chinese citizens to be put in jail.2 46
Indeed, Apple faced a serious challenge to the registration of
its iPhone mark in China, one of its most profitable markets.2 47
When Apple registered its iPhone mark in China in 2002, it sought
protection for the mark in connection with computer hardware and
software, but not for mobile phones. 248 In 2004, Hanwang
Technology Co. registered the "i-Phone" mark for mobile
phones. 249  Because China gives priority based on registration
rather than use in commerce, Hanwang was able to secure the
legal right to use the "i-Phone" mark over Apple's objections. 25 0 If
the United States had offered more predictable protection for
Chinese well-known marks, China might in turn have had a
stronger interest in protecting Apple's marks, perhaps by allowing
for a broader reading of the term "hardware" to include mobile
phones. 251  Apple's experience illustrates some of the problems
242 See Dalilia Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in China, But
an Understanding of China's Culture Will: A Lesson the United States Has to Learn, 15
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 325, 329 (2011) (describing the "climate of hostility" in
trademark enforcement between the United States and China).
243 See id.
244 Id. at 327 ("Trademark piracy in China is still rampant and continues to cost
foreign trademark owners billions of dollars in lost sales and jobs.").
245 See Charles Hutzler, China Pumps Up Limp Protections for Trademarks; As
Beiing Stifens Penalties for the Piracy of Products, Enforcement is Still Suspect, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 2004, at Al 1.
246 Id
247 Heavner, supra note 224, at 55.
248 Id.
249 Id
250 Id
251 Cf Mota, supra note 218, at 477 (describing the WTO complaint by the United
States against Brazil's compulsory licensing statute and Brazil's retaliation by filing its
own WTO complaint against the United States).
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that U.S. companies now face, and will likely face in the future, in
securing protection for well-known marks in other countries.2 52
The United States holds significant advantages in its flexibility
to comply with global intellectual property rights.253 The United
States is a global economic power.25 4  That power can inoculate
the U.S. economy from coercive and retributive influence that
might arise from the failure to enforce foreign marks.255 However,
that does not mean that foreign nations are without the ability to
make their influence felt. Nations with significant economic
power can refuse to aggressively enforce U.S. trademarks in a way
that imperils American interests abroad.256 Other nations can
make trade disputes public and advocate for its position in the
court of public opinion.2 57 It is unlikely that the ITC decision will
provoke a wave of global trade counter-measures. 25 8 The decision
has been in force for approximately five years with criticisms
largely confined to academic critiques.25 9 Yet, the possibility of
negative consequences remains a live issue with unenergetic
enforcement, and other heavy handed actions by the United States
could potentially encourage a response by national interests.
The impact of this response would be felt by the U.S.
government, but the brunt of any response would be shouldered by
American firms doing business abroad. 26 0  Firms with foreign
intellectual property would have to take steps on their own to
protect their intellectual property rights from being used as an
252 For a more in-depth examination of the treatment of foreign famous marks in
China, see Greene, supra note 152.
253 Basheer, supra note 203, at 141.
254 Id
255 See Hoover, supra note 242, at 346.
256 See id at 348.
257 See Basheer, supra note 203, at 141.
258 But see Kristin Zobel, Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known
Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection within the United States, 19 DEPAUL J.
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 170 (2008) (predicting the need for either future legal
or legislative action in order to navigate the ITC decision).
259 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 135 (2d Cir. 2007). See generally
LaLonde, supra note 12; Cook, supra note 6 (explaining that academics see the ITC
decision as a roadblock to progress).
260 See Cook, supra note 6, at 419.
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example for foreign retribution.2 61  The next section briefly
discusses measures American corporations can take to shield their
marks abroad.
IV. Defending U.S. Trademarks Abroad from Retributive
Effects
As noted earlier, the most obvious defense against any
retribution arising from the non-enforcement of foreign marks is
for Congress to amend the Lanham Act to fully protect them.
Reforms are certainly plausible and have been suggested by other
scholars in the past.2 62 Literature exists studying the antecedents,
consequences, and effectiveness of corporate political lobbying
that need not be recounted here. 2 63 The essential argument is little
different than what has been emphasized here: the more
effectively U.S. law protects well-known foreign marks, the more
likely well-known American marks will be protected in foreign
markets.264
Attorneys representing ITC unsurprisingly made this
argument.26 5 ITC argued in its legal brief to the United States
Court of Appeals that the United States cannot expect other
nations to protect its well-known American trademarks if
American courts refused to offer reciprocal protection.26 What is
surprising, given the outcome of the case, is that the Second
Circuit was open and receptive to it.267 The court indeed agreed
that a persuasive policy argument could be made in support of
well-known marks protection.2 68 Citing academic and judicial
sources, the court noted the desirability of the well-known marks
261 See Heavner, supra note 224, at 55.
262 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
263 For thorough reviews of corporate political activity, see generally Amy J.
Hillman, Gerald D. Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political Activity: A Review
and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 837 (2004); Brian Shaffer, Firm-Level Responses to
Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995)
(stating the view that Congress has been wary to look to international law to solve
domestic issues).
264 See Cook, supra note 6, at 419.
265 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007).
266 Id.
267 Id
268 Id
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doctrine due to the global movement of consumers and the rapid
transmission of goodwill-creating information through media and
the internet.269 The court also acknowledged that the well-known
marks doctrine has become essential to prevent exploitation and
piracy in the global trading system.2 70 The court emphasized that
it was the prerogative of Congress to create an exception to the
basic principle of territoriality. 2 7 1
Assuming that the ITC court is arguably correct that Congress
must act in order to recognize the doctrine (the judges in the
Gigante case apparently make no such confining assumption), it is
far from certain that, even with private lobbying, Congress will
amend the Lanham Act.272 In the past, Congress has shown little
interest in taking affirmative steps to incorporate the Paris
Convention and TRIPS into the United States Code.273 While
other provisions of TRIPS have triggered amendments of federal
statutes, Congress has not chosen to address the issue of well-
known foreign marks for over ten years.27 4 Congress might also be
receptive to domestic firms lobbying against the measure in order
to shield themselves from foreign competition.2 75 Combine these
forces with the current congressional climate of suspicion toward
foreign law, and legislative adoption of the foreign marks doctrine
becomes a difficult task.2 76
Congress has shown little interest in improving protection for
well-known foreign marks.277 Members of Congress may be
269 Id (citing De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 (2005)).
270 ITC, 482 F.3d at 165 (citing Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous
Marks: Is Harmony Possible in the Global Village, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 106
(1996)).
271 Id.
272 See Bird, supra note 141, at 355.
273 See Cook, supra note 6, at 416.
274 Tashia Bunch, Well-Known Marks: Where Do We Go From Here?, 90 J.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 227, 231-32 (2008).
275 See Bird, supra note 141, at 323.
276 See generally David T. Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent Views on the Use of
International and Foreign Law: Congress and the Executive versus the Court, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REV 113 (2007) (describing the conflict between the courts and Congress
regarding foreign markets policy).
277 See Bunch, supra note 274, at 231-32.
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reluctant to act because, in addition to the overwhelming number
of other pressing demands, there appear to be no direct and
immediate benefits to their constituents.27 8 United States
companies are unlikely to prioritize the legal protection of their
competitors' intellectual property in their lobbying efforts,
especially when those competitors cannot lobby competitively on
their own behalf. 279
As an alternative to congressional legislation, private interests
could lobby the government to pressure any nation that threatens
to place American trademarks in jeopardy.28 0 American firms
have been skilled at lobbying the executive branch and the United
States Trade Representative to compel compliance with TRIPS
and ensure meaningful enforcement of local intellectual property
law.2 8' If a nation such as India threatens protection of American
marks in retaliation for the United States failing to protect Indian
marks in the United States, the United States could threaten trade
sanctions against India in response.28 2
The problem is that coercion rarely results in long-term
protection for intellectual property rights.2 83 Coercion can provoke
retaliation by the targeted state and devolve the dispute into a trade
war.2 84  Sanctions can hurt American interests, which rely on
foreign trade, and provoke resentment. 285 The result of coercive
efforts might be a short-term defense of well-known marks, but at
a cost of a long-term hostility towards the United States and its
interests.286
Instead of pressuring government officials, U.S. firms can
persuade them that protection of American trademarks is in the
government's best interest. The protection of well-known foreign
marks creates a beneficial economic effect for the domestic
278 But see Cook, supra note 6, at 419.
279 But see id.
280 See Bird, supra note 141, at 322.
281 Id. at 322-23.
282 Id. at 324.
283 Id. at 334-35.
284 Id. at 329.
285 Id. at 335-39.
286 Bird, supra note 141, at 335-39.
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economy.2 87 Local firms, like their foreign counterparts, also
suffer from piracy of their trademarked goods and services. 288
Encouraging strong piracy prevention efforts for all firms and
supplying of multinational expertise and know-how on the issue
would allow local trademark-sensitive enterprises and foreign
mark holders to share a mutual goal.289 Stronger protection of
trademarks will allow local firms to more effectively engage in
local research and development, attract technology transfer, and
improve the local economy.29 0
Defense of foreign trademarks can influence the amount of
foreign direct investment a nation attracts. Strong trademark
protection is particularly important in influencing investment
decisions for low-technology goods such as clothing because of
the ease with which these goods can be pirated.291  As a result,
trademarks lower the cost of exporting for the foreign firm
because the foreign firm needs to spend less to prevent piracy and
compete.2 92 For example, British firm Imperial Tobacco Group
PLC (ITG) planned on building a $70 million factory that would
buy tobacco from 60,000 farmers and license its cigarette rolling
technology from a local partner.2 93 Construction of the factory
was put on hold when ITG learned that a local trader had stolen its
Davidoff trademark.294 Losing at the trial level, ITG ultimately
won its trademark back in an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Indonesia.2 95 The significant delay caused by the local pirate,
however, delayed local farmers and workers access to badly
needed investment dollars until the trademark dispute was
resolved.2 96 The director of Asian business development for ITG
287 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 283.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109,
109-61 (1998).
292 Id
293 Timothy Mapes, Battle to Reclaim a Brand, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., May 22,
2003, at 36.
294 Id.
295 Id.
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said at the time, "The country disqualifies itself in this way - and
you're talking about losing thousands and thousands of jobs. I
listen to my friends and they say, 'Why the hell are you bothering
with this country.' And that's sad. The guy on the street is the
one who eventually suffers."297
Foreign trademark protection can also be construed as a matter
of public safety. The sale of counterfeit trademarked
pharmaceuticals alone constitutes an estimated $512 billion in
global sales each year or five to seven percent of total international
trade.2 98 Counterfeit products threaten public health and safety due
to their typically inferior and sometimes dangerous nature.29 9
Highlighting the safety issues caused by the piracy of a foreign
multinational's trademark can prove more successful than coercive
lobbying of local governments.30 0 When Heinz discovered
Chinese pirates were selling products with their trademarked name
and even copying Heinz's trademarks on uniforms and delivery
trucks, Heinz embarked on a public relations campaign to
highlight the threat to Chinese consumers.30 1 The firm publicized
raids which highlighted the unsanitary conditions of pirated
factories and the risk such conditions would create for children.302
The result was significant interest in local authorities in preventing
counterfeits and no serious further problems from pirates.303
V. Conclusion
The United States has an important leadership role to play in
advocating for robust intellectual property protection. America
can only serve as an effective advocate, however, if its legislation
matches its rhetoric. For a time, the judicial system appeared to be
moving in the right direction with regards to protection of well-
296 Id. See also Tom Wright, Indonesia Turns to Trademark Piracy; Cigarette
Ruling Gives Hope to Foreign Companies Seeking to Protect Brands, WALL ST. J., Sep.
9, 2003, at A20.
297 See Mapes, supra note 293, at 37. See also Wright, supra note 296, at A20.
298 Maria Nelson, Michelle Vizurraga & David Chang, Counterfeit
Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1068 (2006).
299 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 283.
300 See Bird, supra note 141, at 357.
301 Id.
302 Id.
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known foreign marks. The Gigante case decided in the Ninth
Circuit, recognizing the well-known marks doctrine, was the
leading viewpoint on well-known marks and an attractive
precedent for lower courts to follow.30 4 It appeared only a matter
of time before the well-known marks doctrine was cemented as a
principle of trademark law in the U.S. federal judiciary.
The ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini decision changed that trajectory.30 5
The Second Circuit directly disagreed with the Gigante ruling and
refused to recognize the well-known foreign marks doctrine,
instead contending that the issue was a matter for legislative, and
not judicial, resolution. 30 6  As noted above, the result is that
foreign owners of globally famous trademarks cannot be certain as
to whether their trademarks will be recognized in the United States
against an earlier local user.3 07
The ITC decision is more important than one Indian firm's loss
of a single trademark. The decision gives national governments
already predisposed against foreign trademarks and western-style
intellectual property rights the incentive to retaliate in kind against
the United States.30 s Given that U.S. firms hold far more value in
their trademarks abroad than non-U.S. firms hold within the
United States, the possibility exists that the ITC decision will
encourage a foreign response.3 09 Firms need to take steps to
protect themselves before threats occur, or else American marks
remain susceptible to retributive government action.
304 See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2004).
305 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007).
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